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This article argues that health outcomes, specifically nutrition related health outcomes, are socially determined, and can be linked to a 
wider political economy in which peoples’ dietary consumption is structurally determined, evolving from political, economic and social 
forces. The article examines trade and investment agreements as regulatory vehicles that cultivate poor dietary consumption and inequali-
ties in health outcomes between and within countries. How does this happen? The liberalization of trade and investment, and unfettered 
influence of powerful economic interests including transnational food and beverage companies has resulted in trade agreements that enable 
excess availability, affordability and acceptability of highly processed, nutrient poor foods worldwide, ultimately resulting in poor nutrition 
and consequently oral and other non-communicable diseases. These trade and nutrition policy tensions shine a spotlight on the challenges 
ahead for global health and development policies, including achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
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Introduction
What shapes life chances in health, and what forces deter-
mine outcomes for individuals and populations? A political 
economy of health argument proposes that it has very little to 
do with ‘chance’, but rather that peoples’ circumstances are 
structurally determined, evolving from political, economic 
and social contexts (Navarro and Shia, 2001). 
As the Commission on Social Determinants of Health 
(CSDH, 2008) demonstrated, structural factors, including 
global, national and local politics and modes of governance; 
international treaties; economic, social and health policies, 
business practices and social and cultural norms have each 
generated and distributed power, income, goods and services. 
These are distributed unequally between countries and across 
the social hierarchy within countries. These structural factors 
shape the daily conditions in which people are born, grow, 
live, work and age. This results in inequities in access and 
uptake of education and health care, good working condi-
tions, quality housing and built environments, and healthy 
commodities (Marmot et al., 2008; Moodie et al., 2013). 
Here we focus on diet-related health inequities. Many of 
the structural drivers of poor nutrition and diet-related health 
inequities operate directly through the food system (Friel et 
al., 2015). Greater economic globalization, marketization, 
and the increasing power and influence of the business 
sector (Nye and Kamarck, 2002) have profoundly altered 
the purpose and functioning of the food system, shifting 
the relative balance of healthy and unhealthy foods that are 
available for consumption; their price, and the acceptability 
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and hence willingness to consume highly processed foods 
among communities (Baker and Friel, 2016; Buse et al., 
2017; Clapp and Fuchs, 2009; Schram et al., 2015).
In the 1980s two major global policy processes ce-
mented a paradigm shift from nationally focused state 
intervention to globally-oriented market based policy: 
Trade liberalisation and structural adjustment programs 
(McMichael, 2009; Stiglitz, 2006). The World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment 
programs gave loans to developing countries to ease 
their balance of payments problems on older debts, on 
condition of national policy reform. These policy reforms 
required low and middle income countries (LMICs) to 
open up their economies to market forces through the 
liberalisation of trade, investment and the financial sec-
tors and the deregulation and privatisation of nationalised 
industries; to remove regulatory controls on private sec-
tor activity; devalue their currency and tighten monetary 
policy (Labonté et al., 2009). The Uruguay Round of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 
1994 and the creation of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) required signatory countries to open their agri-
food markets by reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
to trade and investment (Hawkes and Murphy, 2010). 
WTO rules promoted the integration of national food 
markets (e.g. through harmonization of food safety 
regulations) and provided a more favourable operating 
environment for the private sector (e.g. through protect-
ing intellectual property), with implications for fast food 
sector trademarks and the protection for plant varieties. 
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Also, the focus of trade policy increasingly shifted to 
include not just agricultural production, but also other 
parts of the food supply chain. Through the liberalisation 
of investment and trade in services, countries opened up 
to investment in food processing, manufacturing, retail 
and advertising by international companies. This had a 
number of implications – it created new mass markets 
in food stuffs previously unavailable; it consolidated 
ownership across sectors and markets, and it provided 
mechanisms that enabled greater food industry influence 
in domestic policy making (Hawkes, 2005). 
Trade and investment: cultivating consumption and 
manufacturing disease
The result of these fundamental global policy changes has 
been a much more market-oriented commodity approach 
to food, nationally and internationally. What has this 
meant for nutrition and health inequities? On the face of 
it, reductions in barriers to trade and investment should 
increase consumer food choices and improve supply for 
net-food importing countries. But these structural changes 
have raised very real nutrition concerns by creating the 
conditions that cultivate the consumption of unhealthy 
foods and thus the ‘manufacture’ of non-communicable 
disease epidemics (Stuckler et al., 2012). These condi-
tions are created in a number of ways. Liberalisation of 
trade and investment directly influences the volume and 
nutritional quality of foods available for consumption, 
and indirectly through expanding the influence of trans-
national food companies within countries by attracting 
investment in the manufacturing, retail and advertising 
of highly-processed foods (Friel et al., 2013; Hawkes, 
2006; Stuckler and Nestle, 2012). The trade mechanisms 
via which the resulting transformation of local consumer 
food environments occurs are: trade in goods, trade in 
services and foreign direct investment (FDI), and health 
policy space, each of which is described briefly below.
Trade in goods
Food trade liberalisation can result in disproportionately 
large increases in imports and domestic production of 
highly processed foods, resulting in a food supply that 
is skewed towards foods which are high in saturated fat, 
calorie-rich and nutrient-poor (Blouin et al., 2009; Ravuvu 
et al., 2017; Thow et al., 2010). While this benefits the 
food industries, it undermines the opportunities among 
populations to consume a healthy diet. For example, the 
historical experience of Pacific Island countries, such as 
Tonga and Samoa, demonstrates that trade liberalization 
is associated with decreased availability of starchy staple 
foods such as yam and taro and increased availability of 
non-traditional processed cereals including white rice, 
wheat bread, and noodles during periods of liberalization 
(Thow et al.,2010; Ravuvu et al., 2017). The opening 
of markets and the import of goods such as cheap fatty 
meats like mutton flaps from New Zealand or turkey tails 
from the USA has further undermined domestic agriculture 
and contributed to import dependency, and high levels of 
consumption of these foods via ready availability and af-
fordability compared to other foods (Legge et al., 2011). 
The lowering of trade barriers between Mexico and the 
USA following the signing of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) saw imports of sugar, snack 
foods, and processed meat products into Mexico increase 
significantly, and foreign investment by US businesses 
more than triple. Not only did this influx of food products 
contribute to the high levels of obesity and diabetes in 
Mexico (Clark et al., 2012), but NAFTA is also under-
stood to have put Mexican farmers out of business and 
restructured food distribution. NAFTA enabled government 
subsidized US farm products into Mexico at artificially low 
prices, which local farmers in Mexico could not compete 
with. Similarly, the entry of US retailers, Walmart and 
Costco, shifted grocery shopping from local markets to 
these companies (Reardon and Berdegue, 2002). 
Trade in services and foreign direct investment (FDI)
Provisions in multilateral, regional and bilateral trade and 
investment agreements have increasingly mandated the 
liberalization of FDI and trade in services. These are major 
pathways to non-communicable diseases, with the trade 
provisions opening up countries to investments in food 
processing, manufacturing, retail and advertising. Transna-
tional Food Corporations (TFCs) use FDI to extend global 
food supply chains, with control over the food supply chain 
shifting to large agri-food processors and transnational 
manufacturing, retail and food service companies such as 
Pepsico, Unilever, Nestle, Carrefour, Wal-Mart, and KFC. 
Not only has the market penetration by TFCs led to 
the global phenomenon of marketplaces crammed with 
highly refined cheap foods (Moodie et al., 2013), it has 
also been accompanied by increasing market concentra-
tion and thus market power held by a small number of 
firms (Baines, 2014; Havinga et al., 2015). Ten food 
processors / manufacturers control 28% of the global 
market. Nestle, Pepsi-Co and Kraft are the top three most 
profitable firms that manufacture agricultural products 
into food products. Walmart, Carrefour and Tesco are 
the most profitable food retailers that sell these foods 
to the consumer (EcoNexus, 2013).
Market concentration increases the buying and sell-
ing power of TFCs, allowing them to dictate terms of 
trade, influence eating habits through the products they 
choose to manufacture, sell, set buying and retail prices, 
and preferentially promote (Baker and Friel, 2016). In 
the manufacturing sector, concentration has been highest 
in ultra-processed foods, in particular the soft drinks, 
biscuits, and snack foods categories. The net effect of 
increasing TFC power is greater availability, affordability, 
and palatability of heavily marketed ultra and highly 
processed foods (Baker and Friel, 2014; Lang and Heas-
man, 2004; Popkin, 2017). Also, with the attendant gains 
in power by the TFCs, has come the removal of power 
from local producers, consumers and in many instances 
policy-makers (Ghosh, 2010).
While this is happening globally, the big concern is 
in emerging economies. With their large populations and 
growing wealth, these countries are particularly attractive 
investment targets for commodity-producing companies. 
For example, TFCs have been targeting Asian markets with 
their high economic growth rates, rapidly urbanizing life-
styles, young and growing populations, and the adoption of 
export-led growth strategies favourable to foreign investment 
(Baker and Friel, 2014; Baker and Friel, 2016; Patel, 2012). 
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Vietnam’s entry into the WTO and the subsequent required 
removal of restrictions on foreign direct investment, led to 
greater investment by TFCs into Vietnam. This enabled 
significant growth in the sales of sugar sweetened carbon-
ated beverages in the country – an increase from 6.7% of 
total beverage sales per year to 23% per year (Figure 1). 
Vietnam is projected to be one of the largest growth markets 
for Coca Cola and Pepsico (Schram, Labonte et al., 2015).
Policy space
The third way in which trade and investment agreements 
create the conditions that enable greater food industry 
penetration into countries, resulting in a cultivation of 
consumption, is through constraints on domestic public 
policy space i.e. constraints on the ‘freedom, scope, and 
mechanisms that governments have to choose, design, and 
implement public policies to fulfil their aims’ (Koivusalo 
et al., 2008). All trade agreements, by design, constrain 
domestic policy space to regulate for health. Under global 
trade rules, domestic policies must not discriminate 
between ‘like’ products imported and produced domesti-
cally, and must be considered the ‘least trade distorting’ 
measure. In principle, under GATT articles XIV and XX, 
countries are allowed to adopt trade restrictive measures 
when it is ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life and health’. However, it must be demonstrated that 
the action is both necessary to protect health and that 
no other less trade-restrictive measure is available. This 
provision has been interpreted very narrowly in trade 
disputes and successful appeals on public health grounds 
have been limited (Labonte et al., 2011). The effect of 
this on domestic health policy was observed in Thailand. 
When the government proposed the introduction of a 
front of pack traffic light labelling system on snack food 
products, on public health grounds, the USA and other 
countries claimed that it would restrict free trade and 
contravened the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (WTO, 2007). Although no ruling was ever made 
on this claim, the Thai government abandoned the traffic 
light system and implemented a monochrome Guideline 
Daily Amounts label (Sirikeratikul and Vasquez, 2011), 
a decision widely regarded as reflecting the interests of 
the food industry.
While risks to regulatory policy space are present in 
all trade agreements, new generation trade agreements 
such as the mega-regionals like the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) extend their reach. The new agree-
ments typically provide stronger investor protections; and 
can require more changes to domestic policies to enable, 
for example, regulatory coherence, transparency, trade 
facilitation and harmonization.  These ‘behind-the-border’ 
regulatory controls on government increasingly limit the 
policy space (Koivusalo and Tritter, 2014). The inclusion 
of investment protection clauses like investor-state dis-
pute settlement (ISDS) arguably preference private rights 
over public interests (Gleeson and Friel, 2013), with the 
potential for health protection measures to attract lengthy 
and costly trade and investment disputes via Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement provisions. This can lead to ‘regulatory 
chill’ - discouraging governments from moving forward 
with policy measures or new legislation, or encouraging 
them to hesitate while they await the outcomes of trade 
disputes (Lencucha and Drope, 2015).  If, as described 
above, trade and investment agreements intensify the 
presence of TFCs in domestic markets, particularly in 
developing countries, this may increase the influence of 
the food industry over regulatory decision-making, and 
reduce the ability of governments to embed nutrition 
in policy-making relating to the food supply (Thow et 
al., 2015). 
What does this mean for oral health and oral health 
inequities? 
It is internationally recognised that poor oral health has a 
profound impact on overall burden of disease (Kassebaum 
et al., 2017). The three most prevalent dental diseases at 
a global level, dental caries, periodontal disease and oral 
cancer, are all influenced by the products and practices of 
TNCs, specifically the sugar (dental caries) and tobacco 
industries (periodontal disease, oral cancer). 
TNCs contribute to oral health inequities primarily 
through their influence on regulatory structures governing 
their activities, for example, regulation on tobacco products 
in economically disadvantaged countries. In many wealthy 
countries, oral health inequalities appear to be increasing, 
Figure 1: Trends in foreign sugar-sweetened carbonated beverages sales in Vietnam and the Philippines, before and after Vietnam’s 
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particularly in relation to untreated dental caries (Kassebaum 
et al., 2015). Lee and colleagues (2016) reported that, for 
example, consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages in 
remote Indigenous Australian communities is both high 
and normalised, and that without supportive regulation and 
market intervention, this consumption is likely to increase. 
Windows of opportunity in global policy? 
There are important structural and normative policy 
changes happening at the global level that are tantalis-
ingly positive. In Kingdon’s (1995) terms, policy forma-
tion occurs when ‘problem, policy and politics’ streams 
couple, i.e. when simultaneously a problem is recognized, 
a solution is available, and the political climate is posi-
tive for change, a window of opportunity opens which 
may facilitate policy change. Possibly supported by the 
growing numbers of policy entrepreneurs in the trade, 
health and nutrition area, as indicated by the growing 
number of quality publications in the field, policy ad-
vocates for action on global malnutrition have ensured 
that one of the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) aims explicitly to end hunger and all forms of 
malnutrition by 2030. However, commitments to further 
trade liberalisation are positioned, somewhat ironically, 
as key mechanisms via which to pursue the SDGs (Buse 
and Hawkes, 2015; United Nations, 2015). At the same 
time, the UN General Assembly has proclaimed the UN 
Decade of Action on Nutrition from 2016 to 2025, with 
UN agencies and states committed to reducing malnutri-
tion and the burden of NCDs (WHO/FAO, 2014). One of 
the six action areas is trade and investment for improved 
nutrition. This is an important window of opportunity, 
with a direction from the highest level of the United Na-
tions to governments and UN agencies to work out how 
to ensure trade can be used in such a way that improves 
nutrition and health
Within WHO, the tide may be turning in relation 
to trade and the commercial determinants of health, in 
particular unhealthy commodity industries. When Dr 
Margaret Chan, the then Director General of WHO gave 
her speech at the 2014 World Health Assembly, she 
noted pointedly the tensions between trade, investment 
and health policy goals:
“International trade has many consequences for health, 
both positive and negative. One particularly disturbing 
trend is the use of foreign investment agreements to 
handcuff governments and restrict their policy space. For 
example, tobacco companies are suing governments for 
compensation for lost profits following the introduction, 
for valid health reasons, of innovative cigarette packag-
ing. In my view, something is fundamentally wrong in 
this world when a corporation can challenge government 
policies introduced to protect the public from a product 
that kills.” Dr Margaret Chan speech at the World Health 
Assembly, 2014
While Chan’s address did not speak to nutrition re-
lated issues, what it did do is signal that the key global 
health institution, WHO, is taking seriously the threats 
from trade agreements and the influence of commercial 
actors on health policy. Importantly, this will cascade 
through to national ministries for health and, hopefully, 
across to other health issues including nutrition.
Opportunities for oral health advocacy and coalition 
building 
There is a clear role for advocacy among all dental 
professionals/oral health policy makers in addressing 
TNCs’ involvement in shaping international oral health 
inequalities. Connecting with other health-oriented actors 
will increase the reach and impact of the oral health 
ideas and needs. The ‘sugar tax’, now implemented in 
a number of OECD countries and recommended by the 
WHO, may yield considerable benefits in reducing oral 
health inequities. Schwendicke and colleagues (2016) 
reported that, in Germany, implementing a 20 percent 
sales tax on sugar-sweetened beverages was likely to 
reduce caries increment (and therefore treatment cost) at 
a population level, especially in young low-income males, 
thereby also reducing inequalities in the distribution of 
caries experience. Increasing the reach of sugar tax to 
a truly global level, as well as continued advocacy of 
tobacco regulation, will likely lead to marked improve-
ments in oral health inequalities. And, as with the policy 
entrepreneurs mentioned above, there is also a growing 
number of quality researchers and advocates in the oral 
health space to challenge the modus operandi of trans-
national corporations and the impact they have on oral 
health outcomes at a global level.  
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